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Abstract
Ubiquitous use of social media such as microblogging platforms opens unprecedented chances for false information to 
diffuse online. Facing the challenges in such a so-called “post-fact” era, it is very important for intelligent systems to not 
only check the veracity of information but also verify the authenticity of the users who spread the information, especially 
in time-critical situations such as real-world emergencies, where urgent measures have to be taken for stopping the spread 
of fake information. In this work, we propose a novel machine-learning-based approach for automatic identification of the 
users who spread rumorous information on Twitter by leveraging computational trust measures, in particular the concept 
of Believability. We define believability as a measure for assessing the extent to which the propagated information is likely 
being perceived as truthful or not based on the proxies of trust such as user’s retweet and reply behaviors in the network. We 
hypothesize that the believability between two users is proportional to the trustingness of the retweeter/replier and the trust-
worthiness of the tweeter, which are complementary to one another for representing user trust and can be inferred from trust 
proxies using a variant of HITS algorithm. With the trust network edge-weighted by believability scores, we apply network 
representation learning algorithms to generate user embeddings, which are then used to classify users into rumor spreaders 
or not based on recurrent neural networks (RNN). Experimented on a large real-world rumor dataset collected from Twitter, 
it is demonstrated that our proposed RNN-based method can effectively identify rumor spreaders and outperform four more 
straightforward, non-RNN models with large margin.
Keywords Rumor detection · Computational trust · Representation learning · Recurrent neural networks
1 Introduction
In recent years, social media platforms have been increas-
ingly witnessed as an emerging sphere for generating and 
spreading false or unverified information. For example, the 
news about Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg offering money 
to Facebook users who do not share social media hoaxes is 
itself a parody of social media hoaxes.1 False rumors can be 
potentially detrimental, triggering serious repercussions or 
consequence in our society. A rumor circulating on Face-
book and Twitter since December 5, 2015 claimed that Mus-
lim residents of Dearborn, Michigan, held a pro-ISIS march, 
where protesters were carrying ISIS flags.2 This rumor was 
circulated following the mass shooting in San Bernardino, 
California, by a U.S.-born Muslim who became radicalized 
while living in the U.S. and whose wife was from Pakistan. 
On a daily basis, such misinformation originates and propa-
gates within social media outlets, rendering the quality and 
credibility of social media content seriously inferior.
Social psychology literature defines rumor as a story or 
a statement whose truth value is unverified or deliberately 
false (Allport and Postman 1965). Differentiating rumor 
from fact, or measuring the truthfulness of information 
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directly is technically very challenging. While one way to 
address this is by debunking the false information using 
rumor detection and classification approach (Castillo et al. 
2011; Liu et al. 2015; Ma et al. 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018a; 
Yang et al. 2012; Wu et al. 2015; Zhao et al. 2015), another 
way is by estimating whether the spreader of concerned 
information is trusted or not and to what extent by their peers 
so as to identify the “high-risk” users who are more likely 
to spread false information online. These high-risk users are 
effectively labeled so that other online users can be drawn 
appropriate attention or be altered against the credibility of 
information posted by the labeled users. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no existing approach that has fallen into 
this second category based on computational trust for rumor 
spreader detection in social media sphere except ours (Rath 
et al. 2017), where we have conducted a pilot study by uti-
lizing the retweet network of Twitter users. This paper is a 
natural extension of the original idea by taking into account 
other types of trust proxies such as reply relationship among 
the users as well as conducting more thorough experimenta-
tions and analyses.
The concept of Trust in Twitter’s retweet network can be 
described generally as follows: a user referred to as A, who 
receives a post tweeted from user B, may intend to share the 
post with his/her followers with the action of propagating 
the information, i.e., retweet. A might also decide to reply 
the tweeter, which can contain some additional information 
or comment in the reply beyond a mere retweet. There are 
two essential factors that can influence the decision of user 
A, who may choose to act on an original post or not: (1) The 
trustworthiness of user B, i.e., the willingness of the network 
to trust B; and (2) the trustingness of A, i.e., the propensity 
of A to trust the other users in the network. According to 
the prior research of computational trust such as Roy (2015) 
and  Roy et al. (2016), trustingness and trustworthiness are 
characterized as a pair of complementary measures of user 
trust in social network and both of them are associated with 
each network user. A person having higher trustingness con-
tributes to the trustworthiness of its neighbors to a lower 
degree, while a higher trustworthiness is a result of lots of 
neighbors linked to the actor having lower trustingness.
Intuitively, users with high trustingness are more likely 
to spread information online than those with low trusting-
ness since they are more likely to believe what someone else 
tweets. When the circulated message is false, such users tend 
to be more likely to become rumor spreaders. On the other 
hand, users with high trustworthiness are generally less likely 
to inject or spread false information than those who have low 
trustworthiness in the sense that the tweets of users who have 
high trustworthiness are historically retweeted more exten-
sively and they are subjectively more cautious on what they 
tweet for maintaining their own reputation. As a result, the 
properties of users in terms of information veracity they are 
involved in propagating can be inferred somehow based on the 
nuance of trust relationships among the users.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach for the identi-
fication of rumor spreaders based on the concept of Believ-
ability, which is a measure defined on the basis of trusting-
ness and trustworthiness metrics. Specifically, believability 
represents the strength of a directed edge between the tweeter 
B and the responder A, indicating how strong the potential 
is for the information from B to be spread through A. The 
basic idea is that the believability of the retweeted message 
is proportional to the trustingness of the responder A and 
the trustworthiness of the tweeter B. To this end, we con-
struct the trust network among users, using retweets, and 
additionally replies, as proxies of trust relationship, for auto-
matically learning the user representation as embeddings in 
a low-dimension space. More specifically, the representa-
tion is inferred from the re-weighted user network with the 
believability on its edges by employing a state-of-the-art net-
work embedding algorithm called LINE (Tang et al. 2015). 
Finally, based on the generated user embeddings, we apply 
supervised machine-learning algorithms such as neural net-
works or other kind of classifiers to categorize the given user 
spreading the specific information as a rumor spreader or not.
In a nutshell, the contributions of our paper are threefold:
– To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to identify rumor spreaders on Twitter by exploring the 
nuance of concepts in computational trust, i.e., trusting-
ness and trustworthiness, for creating a novel measure of 
believability which quantifies the potential of a message 
being spread from one user to the others.
– We propose a novel technical framework that strength-
ens the representation of user properties in consideration 
of information veracity using network feature learning 
based on a large-scale believability re-weighted trust net-
work. Experimental results demonstrate the superiority 
of the proposed method over technically more straight-
forward approaches.
– We build three Twitter datasets using different trust prox-
ies (i.e., retweet-only, reply-only, retweet+reply) based 
on a set of real-world rumorous and non-rumorous events 
gathered from rumor debunking websites, which are 
made publicly available to research community.3
2  Related work
The task of rumor detection can be classified into two cat-
egories: rumor information detection and rumor spreader 
detection. Most of prior research focused on rumor 
3 https ://githu b.com/Bhavt oshRa th/RNN-Trust /tree/maste r/data.
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information detection. Little work has been done, however, 
for rumor spreader detection.
Automatic detection of rumorous information from 
social media is based on traditional classifiers stemming 
from the pioneering study of information credibility on 
Twitter  (Castillo et  al. 2011). In the subsequent stud-
ies (Yang et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2015; Ma et al. 2015, 2016, 
2017; Wu et al. 2015; Zhao et al. 2015), different sets of 
hand-crafted features were proposed and incorporated to 
determine whether a claim about some event is credible 
or not. However, feature engineering in these methods is 
painstakingly labor intensive.  Ma et al. (2016) proposed 
a RNN-based method that automatically learns the repre-
sentations to capture the hidden implications and depend-
encies of complex signals over time, and achieved better 
performance due to the effective representation learning 
capacity of deep neural models. In addition, other neural 
models such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) 
and tree-structure Recursive Neural Networks (RvNN) 
have also been attempted by exploiting either social media 
content or propagation structures of information in the 
recent studies (Yu et al. 2017; Ma et al. 2018b). A com-
prehensive survey focusing on rumor information detec-
tion can be found in Zubiaga et al. (2018), and two others 
focusing on detection on fake news and false information 
in general can be found in Shu et al. (2017) and Kumar and 
Shah (2018). In our work, we focus on the rumor spreader 
detection instead of rumor information detection. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no concrete study con-
ducted so far for identifying rumor spreaders via predic-
tive analytics except for a few other works considering 
spreader characteristics as features for rumor information 
detection (Kwon et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2015).
Computational trust has been studied extensively in 
recent years. Many researchers have tried to assign trust 
scores (Artz and Gil 2007; Kamvar et al. 2003; Mishra and 
Bhattacharya 2011; O’Hara et al. 2004) to the nodes in a 
network to accomplish different type of tasks. Trust scores 
can be defined as scores that an algorithm puts on a node 
in a trust network based on various structural aspects of 
the node. Eigentrust (Kamvar et al. 2003) proposes to rate 
trust scores of peers in a P2P network. These scores can 
help an ordinary user in the network to identify the trust-
worthy peers and initiate content download from them. 
Eigentrust, like Pagerank (Lawrence et al. 1998), calcu-
lates a single score for each node in the network. In this 
algorithm, however, one’s reputation does not play a part 
in the weight of the node’s trust vote. Other researchers 
have proposed measures to rank bias and deserve of a node 
in a network (Mishra and Bhattacharya 2011), in which 
they used an iterative matrix algorithm to calculate bias 
and deserve of nodes which reinforce each other.
Roy (2015) and Roy et al. (2016) proposed a pair of 
complementary measures that can be used to measure trust 
scores of actors in a social network using involvement of 
social networks. Based on the proposed measures, an itera-
tive matrix convergence algorithm based on HITS (Klein-
berg 1999) was developed that calculates the trustingness 
and trustworthiness of each actor in the network. The algo-
rithm runs in O(k × |E|) time where k denotes the number 
of iterations and |E| denotes the number of edges in the 
network. In this paper, we propose a novel measure called 
believability based upon these two complementary meas-
ures for assessing the potential of the message being spread 
from one user to the other, which is used to re-weight the 
edges of the user trust network. Note that the believability 
is in essence different from commonly known concept of 
credibility studied in many papers (Castillo et al. 2011; 
Gupta et al. 2014; Jin et al. 2014; Metzger and Flanagin 
2013), where credibility is primarily used to measure the 
quality of content being believed in or that of a user being 
trusted, but believability here is a measure of “spreadabil-
ity” of information between a pair of users instead of an 
individual user.
Network-based representation learning is an emerging 
area in machine learning. DeepWalk (Perozzi et al. 2014) 
learns node embeddings by exploring local neighborhood 
of the nodes using truncated random walks. Since the strat-
egy of the random walk is uniform following depth-first-
search (DFS) style, it gives no control over the explored 
neighborhoods. Also, it works only for unweighted, undi-
rected graphs. LINE model (Tang et al. 2015) proposes 
a breadth-first strategy to explore neighborhoods. Spe-
cifically, it learns a feature representation in two separate 
phases: first, it learns half of the dimensions by breadth-
first-search (BFS) style simulations over immediate neigh-
bors of nodes, then it learns the other half of dimensions 
by sampling nodes strictly at a two-hop distance from the 
source nodes. This model works for all types of graphs. 
Node2vec (Grover and Leskovec 2016) explores diverse 
network neighborhoods which designs a sampling strat-
egy that smoothly interpolates between BFS and DFS. The 
assumption is that BFS and DFS are extreme sampling para-
digms suited for structural equivalence (i.e., nodes sharing 
similar roles) and homophily (i.e., nodes from the sample 
network community), respectively. Node2vec’s sampling 
strategy accommodates for the fact that these notions of 
equivalence are not competing or exclusive, and real-world 
networks commonly exhibit a mixture of both. Considering 
the weighted, directed nature of our network and the com-
plexity of the learning algorithm, in this paper, we employ 
LINE algorithm with the two-hop distance for generating 
user embeddings from the trust network, where the edges 
are re-weighted by the believability scores.
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3  Trust in social media
Trust is an important part of any social interaction, and in 
the context of social media, researchers have been using 
social networks widely to understand how trust manifests 
among users. However, such an abstract concept of trust that 
attempts to quantify social interaction is generally very hard 
to compute. In general, trust in a social network is defined 
as a set of scores assigned to each actor in the network, rep-
resenting his/her level of trust.
Specifically, the level of trust can be manifested by 
assigning a pair of trust scores to each actor which are 
termed as trustingness and trustworthiness scores  (Roy 
2015). Trustingness of an actor is defined as his propensity 
to trust others in the network. A higher trustingness score 
implies that the actor has a high propensity to trust others in 
the network. On the other hand, trustworthiness, being true 
to its dictionary meaning, defines how trustworthy an actor 
is which is indicated as the willingness of the network as a 
whole to trust an individual actor. Like trustingness score, a 
high trustworthiness score means the trust on the actor from 
other users in the network is strong.
The primary property leveraged to calculate trust scores 
is the negative feedback property of trust. The concept of 
negative feedback in trust can be well understood using the 
example retweet network provided in Fig. 1, which illus-
trates the trust relationships among the users in a retweet 
network, where the direction of edges indicates that trust is 
given to tweeters from retweeters and the number of times 
of retweeting between two users is used as edge weights. As 
we can see, there are users, e.g., E, which has a high pro-
pensity to trust other users as E trusts almost all users in the 
network except node A. Thus, it implies that E will accord 
trust to almost anyone in the network which should decrease 
the weight of its trust vote compared to a node like C which 
accords its trust very selectively. In contrast, it can be seen that 
node A is a highly trusted user since a large number of users in 
the network retweet its post. Moreover, other nodes such as B, 
C, D that trust it in turn trusts a very selective amount of other 
nodes which makes their votes more valuable compared to 
E. Using the negative feedback property, it can be said that a 
higher trustingness score contributes to the trustworthiness of 
its neighbors to a lower degree, and a higher trustworthiness 
score is a result of lots of neighbors having low trustingness 
scores. Same applies to a reply network.
For quantifying the trust, we require proxies of trust that 
can map the social interactions to the original concepts of 
trust. In the context of social network on Twitter, there can 
be various levels of user interactions acting as the prox-
ies, such as following, retweeting, liking, and replying. For 
example, a user whose tweets are more likely to be retweeted 
by others is expected to have a high trustworthiness score, 
while a user who is more likely to retweet others’ tweets 
is expected to have a high trustingness score. Without the 
loss of generality, in our work, we adopt retweeting, and 
additionally, replying interactions as the proxies of trust, and 
our proposed model is generic and can be straightforwardly 
extended to accommodate any other kind of proxies.
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudo code of Trust in Social 
Media (TSM) algorithm for computing trustingness and 
trustworthness scores (Roy 2015).
Algorithm 1 Trust in Social Media (TSM)
Data: 1. A directed graph G=(V, E) consisting of vertices and edges with or
without weights.
2. Maximum number of permitted iterations, k and/or
3. Difference of scores between two iterations, δ.
Result: A set of trust scores: {(trustingness, trustworthiness)} for ∀ v ∈V.
Initialize all v ∈V to (1,1).
for (i = 1; max(max(|tii(v) - tii−1(v)|), max(|twi(v) - twi−1(v)|) <δ or i ≤
k; i++) do
for each node v ∈V do








out(v) = set of all vertices which are destination vertex of all outgoing
edges from v ;
end
for each node v ∈V do


















Fig. 1  An illustration of trust in a retweet network, in which the 
nodes are users and the directed edges indicate the retweet relation-
ship, and each edge can be weighted by the frequency of retweets 
between two users associated with the edge
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3.1  Trustingness and trustworthiness
To calculate trustingness and trustworthiness scores, we use 
the TSM algorithm (Roy 2015) that takes a directed graph 
as input together with a specified convergence criteria or a 
maximum permitted number of iterations. In each iteration 
for every node in the network, trustingness and trustworthi-
ness are computed using the equations below:
where u and v are user nodes, ti(v) and tw(u) are trustingness 
and trustworthiness scores of v and u, respectively, w(v, x) is 
the weight of edge from v to x, out(v) is the set of outgoing 
edges of v, in(u) is the set of incoming edges of u, and s is 
the Involvement of the network. Involvement of a network 
is defined as the amount of risk involved in making a wrong 
link in the network. The higher the risk is in a social network 
(i.e., the higher the involvement score), the higher the effect 
of a neighbors trustingness should be on the calculation of 
the current node trustworthiness, and vice versa. It is thus 
the potential risk an actor takes when creating a link in the 
network.
Typically, a user survey can be used to determine the 
involvement score of different networks, because involve-
ment is a concept inherently perceived by network users. 
The survey questionnaire can be designed by adopting well-
established involvement measurement with a series of seven-
point scales. In the survey questionnaire, a detailed descrip-
tion of each social network is provided. Primarily, what each 
node in the particular social network refers to is listed and 
also what each link in the network represents. To measure 
involvement, the respondents are asked questions which are 
considered proxies for involvement. The questions measured 
the potential risk of creating a wrong link in the network 
and the perceived risks associated with the networks. The 
involvement score for Twitter is set to a constant empirically 
according to Roy (2015).
Once the trust scores are calculated for each node in the 
network, TSM normalizes the scores (Roy 2015) by adher-
ing to the normalization constraint so that both the sum of 
trustworthiness and the sum of trustingness of all nodes in 
the network equal to 1. However, a salient problem of such 
normalization method lies in that the scale of the scores is 
dependent on the size of the network. When the network 
is very large, the resulting scores will become extraordi-

















normalization based on the logarithm of the scores output 
by TSM to normalize the trustingness and trustworthiness 
scores into the range of (0,1].
3.2  Believability
Trustingness and trustworthiness, from different perspec-
tives, are used to measure the level of trust of each individ-
ual user. But they do not quantify the strength of inter-user 
trust, i.e., the trust between two specific users who have 
retweet or reply relationship. The intensity of inter-user 
trust is very important to indicate the potential or capacity 
of user network edges for transmitting messages. When a 
message is propagated, the strength of inter-user trust along 
the propagation path would largely determine how fast and 
how far the message could be transmitted over the network. 
In the original trust model in Fig. 1, edges weighed by the 
frequency of retweets between two users cannot reflect such 
kind of “spreadability” of network edges. In this regard, 
a new method of re-weighting the edges is very much 
desirable.
We propose the new concept called Believability, a quan-
titative figure that is computed for a directed edge between 
two nodes used to measure the potential of messages being 
transmitted through the edge based on the strength of belief 
between two neighbors on that edge. In the context of 
retweet, a directed edge from B to A exists if a tweet of A 
is retweeted by B. The believability quantifies the strength 
that B trusts on A when B decides to retweet A. Therefore, 
B is more likely to believe in A if:
1. A has a high trustworthiness score, i.e., A is highly 
likely to be trusted by other users in the network, or
2. B has a high trustingness score, i.e., B is highly likely to 
trust others.
The same applies to the case of reply. So, the believability 
score is supposed to be proportional to the two values above, 
which can be jointly determined and computed as follows:
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the believ-
ability and the trust measures given a retweet or reply edge 
in the user network. The believability score will be used to 
re-weight the edges so that the representation of users can 
be reasonably learned with the differentiation of variable 
spreadability of different edges. The key reason why this can 
result in better user representation learning is that the inter-
user believability score will lead to the random walk being 
biased to favorably travel towards nodes via high believ-
ability edges (see Sect. 4), thus potentially maximizing the 
transmission capacity of information over the network.
(3)Believability(B → A) = tw(A) ∗ ti(B).
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4  User representation learning
In this section, we will discuss how to automatically rep-
resent the users based on the re-weighted network using 
believability scores as the edge weights.
4.1  Rumorous users and context
We def ine the  network as  G = (V ,E) ,  where 
V = {u1, u2,… , un} refers to a set of nodes each representing 
a user, and E = {wij} is a set of directed edges corresponding 
to the relationship (retweet or reply) among the nodes in V, 
which are weighted by the believability scores.
Figure 3 illustrates the contexts of network where simi-
lar users should be represented closely to each other in 
the embedding space. Without loss of generality, we illus-
trate three basic cases of context where two users u and u′ 
reside, which should be considered similar users, and how 
their similarity is related to rumor propagation:
(a) u and u′ act mutually as the context of one another and 
the u–u′ weight is strong, suggesting that u may be a 
“hard-core fan” of u′ . If u′ is a frequent rumor spreader, 
so potentially very likely is u because of the generally 
low veracity of information provided by u′ ; and con-
versely, u′ is more likely to be rumorous if u is often 
rumorous since most of the information u spreading is 
coming from u′.
(b) u and u′ share many common neighbors (such as u1 , 
u2 , u3 ) with in-links, implying that they have a large 
overlapping group of fans who trust them. If u often 
pollutes his fans with hearsays while still not losing its 
audiences, it is very likely that u′ is similar to u in terms 
of information spreading behaviors, because otherwise 
they could not own many common followers.
(c) Similar but different as (b), u and u′ share many neigh-
bors with out-links, indicating that both of them trust 
in a common group of sources of messages. If u is a 
frequent receiver of rumors, it is reasonable to infer that 
u′ is inclined to be similar as u because of substantial 
overlap of their information source or context.
As such, by considering the commonality of context, 
similar users will be projected closely in the representa-
tion space for yielding better classification effectiveness.
4.2  User embeddings
We adopt the second-order proximity between a pair 
of nodes in a network-based representation learning 
method (Tang et al. 2015) which is called LINE, to learn 
user embeddings based on the retweet and reply user net-
work depicted above. The goal is to embed each user ui ∈ V  
into a lower-dimensional space ℝd by learning a function 
fG ∶ V → ℝ
d , where d is the dimension of the projected vec-
tor. Specifically, for each ui , let vi denote the embedding of ui 
as a node and v′
i
 be the representation of ui when treated as 
Fig. 2  An illustration of believ-
ability, which is proportional to 
the trustworthiness of A and the 
trustingness of B
Fig. 3  An illustration of similar 
users in a network, where u and 
u′ are deemed similar in differ-
ent contexts. Therefore, u and u′ 
should be projected closely in 
the representation space
Social Network Analysis and Mining (2018) 8:64 
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a specific context of other nodes. For each edge ui → uj , the 
conditional probability of uj being generated by ui as context 
is defined as follows:
Given this definition, the nodes sharing similar contexts will 
have similar conditional distributions over the entire set of 
nodes. To preserve the context proximity, the objective is to 
make p(uj|ui) be close to its empirical distribution p̂(uj|ui) , 
where the empirical distribution can be observed from the 
weighted social context network. Thus, the objective func-
tion is defined as:
where d(⋅, ⋅) is the distance between two probabilities based 
on KL-Divergence, i is the prestige of ui which is set to ui ’s 
out-degree di following (Tang et al. 2015), and the empirical 
distribution is computed as p̂(uj|ui) = wij∕di , where wij is the 
weight of the edge (i, j).
In the learning, we use LINE4 for optimizing equation 5, 
which provides an efficient solution based on negative sampling 
of edges and asynchronous stochastic gradient descent over the 
mini-batches of the sampled edges for parameter update.
5  Identifying spreaders of rumors
To identify the rumor spreaders out of a large number users, 
we use Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to model the clas-
sification process. RNN is used as the classification model 
for two reasons: first, our data are based on time sequence, 
i.e. retweets/replies are sequential in nature, where RNN is 
naturally suitable for the structure of data. Second, the training 
data are of variable length, i.e., the source tweets can have dif-
ferent number of retweets/replies, for which RNN also fits. It 
is important to note that there is no fixed time interval between 
two successive actions. Therefore, we can safely consider that 
the data are a time sequence instead of time series.
In our experiments (see Sect. 6), we adopt two variants of 
RNN model: Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated 
Recurrent Unit (GRU) model to leverage long-distance 
dependencies of units in the sequence.
5.1  RNN‑based user model
An RNN is a type of feed-forward neural network that can 





















A basic RNN is formalized as follows: given an input 
sequence (x1,… , xT ) , for each time step, the model updates 
the hidden states (h1,… , hT ) and generates the output vec-
tor (o1,… , oT ) , where T depends on the length of the input. 
From t = 1 to T, the algorithm iterates over the following 
equations:
where U , W and V  are the input-to-hidden, hidden-to-hidden 
and hidden-to-output weight matrices, respectively, b and 
c are the bias vectors, and tanh(.) is a hyperbolic tangent 
nonlinearity function.
Typically, the gradients of RNNs are computed via back-
propagation through time (Rumelhart et al. 1986). In practice, 
because of the vanishing or exploding gradients (Bengio et al. 
1994), the basic RNN cannot learn long-distance temporal 
dependencies with gradient-based optimization. One way to 
deal with this is to make an extension that includes “memory” 
units to store information over long time periods, commonly 
known as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) unit (Hochreiter 
and Schmidhuber 1997; Graves 2013). Gated Recurrent Unit 
(GRU) (Cho et al. 2014) is another simpler RNN model.
LSTM networks were designed to address the vanish-
ing gradients through a gating mechanism. They are basi-
cally an alternative way of computing the hidden state. 
LSTMs use the following equations to compute the hidden 
state (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997; Graves 2013):
For a basic RNN model, the inputs to the unit were xt (the 
current input at time step t) and ht−1 (the hidden state in 
previous time step), and the output was a new hidden state 
ht and the output state ot at current time step. In LSTM, 
however, the hidden state is computed based on the states 
of some internal gates using the above equations, which are 
explained as follows: it , ft , and ot are the input, forget and 
output gates computed for time step t. They have the same 
equations but different parameter matrices. They are called 
gates because the sigmoid function  converts these into 
vectors in range between 0 and 1. Multiplying these gates 
element-wise lets us decide how much of the other vector is 
let through to the next hidden unit. gt is a candidate hidden 
state that is computed based on the current input and the 
previous hidden state. The internal memory ct is computed 
(6)
ht = tan h(Uxt +Wht−1 + b),
ot = Vht + c,
it = (xtUi + ht−1Wi),
ft = (xtUf + ht−1Wf ),
ot = (xtUo + ht−1Wo),
gt = tan h(xtUg + ht−1Wg),
ct = ct−1 ⋅ ft + gt ⋅ it,
ht = tan h(ct) ⋅ ot.
4 http://githu b.com/tangj ianpk u.
 Social Network Analysis and Mining (2018) 8:64
1 3
64 Page 8 of 16
as previous memory ct−1 multiplied by the forget gate, and 
the newly computed hidden state g, multiplied by the input 
gate. This mechanism allows LSTM to not ignore the old 
memory completely. We finally compute the output hidden 
state ht by multiplying the hyperbolic tangent of internal 
memory with the output gate.
The model of GRU is very similar to that of LSTM layer, 
however, more simplified. A GRU has gating units that 
modulate the flow of the content inside the unit, but a GRU 
is simpler than LSTM with fewer parameters. The follow-
ing equations are used for a GRU unit in hidden layer (Cho 
et al. 2014):
where a reset gate rt determines how to combine the new 
input with the previous memory, and an update gate zt 
defines how much of the previous memory is cascaded into 
the current time step, and h̃t denotes the candidate activation 
of the hidden state ht.
The major difference between LSTM and GRU can be 
summarized as follows: (1) while an LSTM unit consists 
of three gates, GRU unit consists of two gates; (2) LSTM 
unit has an internal memory unit while the GRU unit does 
not; (3) It is easier to train GRUs than LSTMs as they have 
fewer parameters. On large datasets, however, LSTMs tend 
to give better results.
We use the recurrent units of LSTM and GRU to fit the 
time steps as the basic identification framework. For each 
source tweet, all of its retweeting or replying users are 
ordered in terms of the time stamps that indicate when the 
different users retweet or reply it. In each time step, we input 
the embedding of the user who retweets or replies the mes-
sage at that time step. Suppose that the dimensionality of 
the generated user embedding is K. The structure of our 
RNN model is illustrated in Fig. 4. Note that an output unit 
is associated with each of the time steps, which uses sig-
moid function for the probabilistic output of the two classes 
indicating the input user is a rumor spreading user or not.
zt = 𝜎(xtUz + ht−1Wz),
rt = 𝜎(xtUr + ht−1Wr),
h̃t = tan h(xtUh + (ht−1 ⋅ rt)Wh),
ht = (1 − zt) ⋅ ht−1 + zt ⋅ h̃t,
Let gc , where c denotes the class label, be the ground-
truth two-dimensional multinomial distribution of a user. 
Here, the distribution is of the form [1, 0] for rumor spread-
ing users and [0, 1] for non-rumor spreading users. For each 
training instance (i.e., each source tweet), our goal is to min-
imize the squared error between the probability distributions 
of the prediction and ground truth:
where gc and pc are the gold distribution and predicted dis-
tribution, respectively, i represents the model parameters to 
be estimated, and the L2-regularization penalty is used for 
trading off the error and the scale of the problem.
5.2  Naive user models
Instead of using a RNN-based user model presented in 
Sect. 5.1, one may come up with some naive and more 
straightforward models based upon the property of trust.
5.2.1  Trustingness‑only model
Intuitively, users with high trustingness, who easily trust oth-
ers, are more likely to spread rumors. Our trustingness-only 
model simply learns a threshold based on the correlation 
between the trustingness score and ground truth of users in 
the training data. With the threshold, the model can easily 
predict user class given the trustingness of a new user. The 
model is described as follows:
where ti is the threshold of trustingness score to be learned 
from training.
5.2.2  Trustworthiness‑only model
In contrast, the users with high trustworthiness who are 
more trustworthy are less likely to spread rumors. The 
trustworthiness-only model similarly learns a threshold 











true if trustingness(u) ≥ ti;
false otherwise
Fig. 4  Our RNN-based model. U, W, V are weight matrices corresponding to the input-to-hidden, hidden-to-hidden and hidden-to-output param-
eters, respectively. R means the user is a rumor spreading user and N means not a rumor spreading user
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the trustworthiness score and ground truth label of users. 
Similar to Eq. 7, the trustworthiness-only model is given 
as below:
where tw is the threshold of trustworthiness score to be 
learned from training data.
5.2.3  Interpolation model
The interpolation model linearly combines the trusting-
ness and trustworthiness scores in such a way that they are 
interpolated with the appropriate weights to give an optimal 
prediction on its trust score. The trust score of a given user 
can be predicted as:
where  is the weight that can be fixed during training stage. 
With the similar thresholding strategy above, we can obtain 
the threshold tr of the interpolated trust score, and the class 
of user can be predicted as follows:
5.2.4  Logistic regression classifier with user embeddings
For machine-learning-based approach, in addition to use 
RNN-based model, we can also utilize other type of classi-
fiers such as logistic regression or support vector machines 
for classifying the users. The user embeddings generated 
from the LINE algorithm can be straightforwardly treated 
as features of the classifiers.
Here we use the L2-regularized logistic regression (L2_
LR) classifier (Fan et al. 2008). The L2_LR solves the fol-
lowing unconstrained optimization problem:
where xi and yi are the input vector of an instance and its 
prediction, and w is the vector of model parameters to learn. 
The reasons why we have chosen L2_LR are that (a) it has 
consistently delivered state-of-the-art performance in sev-
eral applications (Conroy and Sajda 2012; Zou et al. 2015), 
and is thus a strong contender, and (b) logistic regression, 
like RNN, natively outputs posterior probabilities (Murphy 




false if trustworthiness(u) ≥ tw;
true otherwise.
T(u) =  ∗ trustingness(u) + (1 − ) ∗ trustworthiness(u)
(9)prediction(u) =
{

















6  Experiments and results
In this section, we will describe the collection of datasets, 
comparative experiments and the results achieved.
6.1  Data collection
We constructed our datasets based on two reference datasets, 
namely Twitter15 (Liu et al. 2015) and Twitter16 (Ma et al. 
2016), which were previously used for binary classification 
of rumor and non-rumor with respect to a given event that 
contains its relevant tweets. The two Twitter datasets were 
originally constructed by first gathering a set of rumorous 
and non-rumorous events from rumor debunking websites 
such as www.snope s.com. For every event on the debunk-
ing websites, there is a main claim about the specific event 
which is associated with it. Then they gathered the relevant 
tweets of each event via keyword search on Twitter’s site, 
for which a set of keywords were manually composed based 
upon the claim of each event (Liu et al. 2015; Ma et al. 
2016).
In our work, given the main claim of each event in the 
two datasets, we extracted from them the popular source 
tweets that are highly retweeted or replied. We then con-
structed the propagation threads (i.e., retweets and replies) 
for these source tweets. Because Twitter API cannot retrieve 
the retweets and replies, we gathered the retweet users for a 
given tweet from Twrench.5 We also crawled the replies to 
the source tweets through Twitters web interface. Note that 
each main claim is associated with a gold-standard veracity 
label, i.e., rumor or non-rumor, derived directly from the 
rumorous and non-rumorous events on the rumor debunking 
websites. The label of the claim associated with event will be 
used to generate the ground truth of users for rumor spreader 
detection (see Sect. 6.1.2).
6.1.1  User trust network
Based on the users appearing in these events, we con-
structed three networks (i.e., retweet-only, reply-only and 
retweet+reply) using the following steps:
1. We merged the two reference datasets into one large cor-
pus;
2. We obtained the follow relationships among the users 
that have appeared across all the events for getting an 
initial user network.6 In particular, we treat the follow 
relationship on Twitter as a special yet rudimentary form 
5 https ://twren .ch.
6 We used Twitter API for getting maximum 5k friends of each user, 
and obtained more friends by requests via Twitter’s Web interface.
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of retweet with frequency of 1 (i.e., a follow relationship 
is counted as one-time retweet) to alleviate the sparsity 
of the generated retweet network.
3. From each of the events, we extracted popular source 
tweets with more than 50 retweets and replies alto-
gether7 that are highly responded;
4. We collected all the retweet users for each source sta-
tus.8 These retweet relationships are added as edges into 
the initial users network above to form the retweet-only 
network.
5. We then collected all the reply users for each source 
status.9 These reply relationships are added as edges into 
the initial user network to form the reply-only network.
6. We finally generate the retweet+reply network by join-
ing the two networks obtained above.
The statistics for the three networks are shown in Tables 1. 
These three user networks will be used to compute the user 
trust scores for then generating the user embeddings (see 
Sects. 3 and 4).
6.1.2  User classification dataset
We also built user classification dataset for our RNN models 
(see Sect. 5.1) based on the source tweets, where each source 
tweet is associated with a sequence of retweeters/repliers 
ordered by the time stamp when the retweet/reply occurs.
The ground-truth label for each user is determined by the 
nature of the source tweet by following these rules:
1. If the main claim of event is reported as rumorous and 
the source tweet supports it, the ground truth of the 
users participating in spreading it is labeled as rumor 
spreaders; if the source tweet denies the claim, the users 
participating in spreading it are labeled as non-rumor 
spreaders.
2. If the main claim is reported as a non-rumor, the ground 
truth labels of the users responding to the source tweet 
are assigned in an opposite way as the rumor case above 
depending on the specific stance of the source tweet that 
the users are participating in spreading.
3. When a user appears both in rumor and non-rumor 
cases, we check the frequency that the user has appeared 
in the two cases: if it appears more often in rumor than 
in non-rumor cases, it is labeled as a rumor spreader; 
otherwise labeled as a non-rumor spreader.
According to these rules, the procedure of ground truth 
assignment was carried out semi-automatically, in which 
only the stance of source tweets need to be determined 
manually.
The statistics on the user classification datasets are shown 
in Tables 2. As we can observe, there are few major distinc-
tions between the retweet and reply dataset generated, which 
may contribute to the differences in the experimental results 
reported in later section. These differences are described as 
follows:
– The reply dataset is much smaller than the retweet data-
set (both in terms of network size and average sequence 
length). This is due to the fact that the most popular inter-
actions among users on Twitter are retweet rather than 
reply, which is reflected properly in our data.
– While each sequence in the retweet dataset has different 
users, this need not be the case with the reply dataset, as 
few users in the dataset can participate in the conversa-
tion chain via reply multiple times.
– Reply and retweet are both indicators of active engage-
ment with information exchange. We believe that retweet 
Table 1  Statistics of user trust networks
Retweet Reply Combined
Total # of nodes 1,292,708 1,122,797 1,321,872
Total # of edges 19,533,330 18,535,341 19,645,380
Avg in-degree 15.1 16.5 14.9
Max in-degree 95,303 95,302 95,303
Min in-degree 0 0 0
Avg out-degree 15.1 16.5 14.9
Max out-degree 52,519 6,740 58,274
Min out-degree 0 0 0
Table 2  Statistics of user classification datasets
Retweet Reply Combined
# of unique users 902,806 98,373 969,857
# of users spreading rumors 417,569 49,671 415,846
# of users not spreading rumors 485,237 48,702 554,011
Total # of source tweets 3098 3068 3098
# of rumor source tweets 1716 1690 1716
# of non-rumor source tweets 1382 1378 1382
Avg # length of source tweet 
sequences
413.98 52.48 464.9
Max # length of source tweet 
sequences
2915 814 3145
Min # length of source tweet 
sequences
49 2 56
7 Though unpopular tweets could be fake, we ignore them as they do 
not draw much attention and are hardly impactful.
8 Since Twitter API cannot retrieve over 100 retweets, we gathered 
the retweet users for a given tweet from Twrench (https ://twren .ch).
9 We generated the replies of the source tweets using PHEME toolkit 
(https ://githu b.com/azubi aga/pheme -twitt er-conve rsati on-colle ction ; 
Zubiaga et al. 2015).
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is, however, a stronger indication of trust than reply. This 
is because: (1) through a retweet, a user basically causes 
information broadcasting to all its followers, and in con-
trast, a reply is not broadcasted, and remains confined to 
the conversation chain of the source tweet. (2) A retweet 
contains nothing but the original post, implying a sup-
portive stance on source tweet. A reply, however, can 
contain additional text expressing a different attitude 
toward the source message.
6.2  Settings and protocols
We ran TSM to get the trust scores based on our networks, 
which is then re-weighted by the believability scores. We 
adopted the generic setting of TSM involvement parameter 
s = 0.391 by referring to Roy (2015). Then, we learned the 
user embeddings in the networks by running LINE algo-
rithm, where we empirically set the size of embeddings as 
200 and kept other parameters as the default settings.
For user classification, we fed the sequence of users of 
each source tweet into RNN’s input layer one at a time and 
trained the RNN model by employing the derivative of the 
loss with respect to all the parameters via back propaga-
tion (Collobert et al. 2011). We used gradient descent for 
parameter update. The size of the hidden units is set as 100 
and the learning rate as 0.005, and the number of epoch as 
100 for ensuring the convergence of RNN. In prediction, the 
probabilities of the same users if they appear across differ-
ent source tweets are averaged for predicting the final class 
labels.
We made systematic comparisons among the following 
eight models:
– Trustingness    The trustingness-only user model 
(Sect. 5.2.1);
– Trustworthiness  The trustworthiness-only user model 
(Sect. 5.2.2);
– Interpolation  The model that interpolates the trusting-
ness-only and trustworthiness-only models (Sect. 5.2.3);
– L2_LR  The L2-regularized logistic regression classifier 
using user embeddings as features (Sect. 5.2.4);
– GRU_noweight  The GRU-based RNN user model using 
user embeddings as features which were obtained from 
the unweighted user network whose edge weights are all 
set equal to 1;
– GRU_notrust  The GRU-based RNN user model using 
user embeddings as features which were obtained from 
the initial user network (with only follow relationship) 
without considering other trust relationship;
– GRU_trust  The GRU-based RNN user model using user 
embeddings as features which were obtained from the 
user network whose edges are re-weighted with believ-
ability scores.
– LSTM_trust  The LSTM-based RNN user model using 
user embeddings as features which were obtained from 
the user network whose edges are re-weighted with 
believability scores.
For evaluation purpose, we ran experiments based on tenfold 
cross-validation and used five common evaluation metrics: 
accuracy, area under the receiver operating characteristic 
curve (AUROC), precision, recall and F1 measure. The 
accuracy is def ined over the two classes as: 
Accuracy =
# of correctly predicted users
Total # of users
 . AUROC is the area under 
the graphical plot which combines true positive rate and 
false positive rate into one metric and provides a measure of 
performance (between 0 and 1) across all possible classifica-
tion thresholds. In all our models we have used the classifi-
cation threshold of 0.5. The rest of the three metrics are 
defined for each individual class: for the positive class, i.e., 












where TP, FP and FN are true positive rate, false positive 
rate and false negative rate, respectively. The corresponding 
metrics for the negative class, i.e., non-rumor spreading 
users, are defined similarly.
7  Results and analysis
We now provide a detailed description and analysis of the 
experimental results for the three datasets in the following 
three sections.
7.1  Retweet‑only dataset
Table 3 shows experimental results run on the retweet-only 
dataset. It is observed that Trustingness model has an accu-
racy of 0.538. Trustworthiness model shows a marginal 
increase in accuracy 0.56%. AUROC for Trustworthiness 
model also shows a minor increase of 5.2% over Trusting-
ness model. While the precision of rumor class notice-
ably drops by 25.7%, the recall of the same class increases 
sharply by 800%. Other metric values remain almost identi-
cal. This is because the trustworthiness scores are much bet-
ter scaled than the trustingness scores. The network is very 
sparse with a large number of star-shaped sub-graphs. This 
means that a large portion of the nodes have no outgoing 
edges, which results in lots of identical trustingness scores. 
However, the two models are basically comparable, which 
is attributed to the fact that the two scores are complemen-
tary measures derived from a global user interaction network 
which are essentially the reciprocal sides of trust. So, overall 
they contribute equally to the spreader detection.
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The Interpolation model which combines the above two 
models shows similar results. Since the interpolation method 
just adopts a linear combination of the trustingness and trust-
worthiness scores, it is cannot capture any feature-level cor-
relation, and as expected its performance lies in-between, 
with an accuracy of 0.539 and an AUROC of 0.513. In com-
parison with Trustworthiness model, while the metrics for 
the non-rumor class show almost identical results, rumor 
class shows slight decrease in all metrics.
L2_LR, which uses as features the embeddings based 
on believability-weighted edge scores, also shows similar 
results. The AUROC score suggests that the model acts as 
a random predictor. This is a bit surprising since it appears 
that L2_LR which is a learning-based model fails to learn 
useful patterns from the generated embeddings. There could 
be reasons from two aspects: (1) a point to notice in base-
line results is that both recall and F1 scores are very low for 
rumor class. It shows a bias towards predicting most classes 
as non-rumor spreaders, resulting in very low True Positives 
and False Positives, which could be attributed to the fact 
that the edge-density ratio of the network is very low due to 
the sparsity of the network. This caused the trust scores to 
be less scaled. (2) Using such embeddings resulting from a 
sparse network, L2_LR, although being learning-based, does 
not consider higher level abstractions or correlations among 
these features, and also cannot naturally take into account 
the dependencies among the users in the sequence, rendering 
model’s generalizability as low as the simple Interpolation 
model.
The GRU_noweight model employs the RNN algorithm 
for user classification but does not take into consideration 
the different strength of the retweet edges. The accuracy 
for the model is 0.618, which gives around 15.1% improve-
ment over L2_LR model. AUROC for the model is 0.655, 
a significant improvement of 31% over the L2_LR model. 
More importantly, recall and F1 scores on both classes show 
a significant improvement over baseline results. Thus we 
can conclude that the user representation learning based on 
even unweighted retweet relationships together with RNN 
classification improves the ability to identify rumor spread-
ers. This can be attributed to the strong learning capacity 
of RNN-based models by the use of hidden units capturing 
complex feature correlations and the consideration of long-
distance temporal dependencies among the users.
The GRU_notrust model takes into account the basic 
following relationship while the GRU_noweight con-
siders the unweighted retweet network. The accuracy is 
improved over the L2_LR by 10.2% to achieve 0.592. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the follow relationship 
network is sparser than the retweet network, which is a 
sub-graph of the retweet relationship network. However, 
GRU_notrust shows a minor decrease of 4.2% in accuracy 
and a slight increase of 0.91% in the AUROC score over 
GRU_noweight model.
The GRU_trust and LSTM_trust models consider 
the believability scores for the retweet edges based on the 
complementary trust measures derived from the overall 
topology of the network. The accuracy for GRU_trust is 
Table 3  Result comparison of 
different identification models 
on the retweet-only dataset
‘+’ denotes rumor spreading user, and ‘−’ denotes non-rumor spreading user (TN: trustingness; TW: trust-
worthness; TNnTW:  interpolation; L2_LR:  L-2 regularized logistic regression; GRU_NW:  GRU_
noweight; GRU_NT: GRU_notrust; GRU_TR: GRU_trust; LSTM_TR: LSTM_trust)
Method Model Class Accuracy AUROC Precision Recall F
1
Naive TN + 0.538 0.498 0.847 0.002 0.003
− 0.538 0.999 0.699
TW + 0.541 0.524 0.629 0.018 0.036
− 0.540 0.990 0.699
TNnTW + 0.539 0.513 0.609 0.016 0.032
− 0.538 0.990 0.697
L2_LR + 0.537 0.500 0.891 0.000 0.001
− 0.537 0.999 0.698
RNN GRU_NW + 0.618 0.655 0.555 0.478 0.513
− 0.654 0.721 0.686
GRU_NT + 0.592 0.661 0.536 0.249 0.340
− 0.606 0.842 0.705
GRU_TR + 0.664 0.716 0.590 0.664 0.625
− 0.731 0.663 0.695
LSTM_TR + 0.698 0.731 0.626 0.706 0.664
− 0.764 0.692 0.726
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further improved over GRU_notrust by 12.1% and reaches 
0.664. Also, its accuracy improves over GRU_noweight and 
L2_LR models by 7.4% and 23.6%, respectively. In addi-
tion, the AUROC of GRU_trust increases by 8.3% over 
GRU_notrust to reach 0.716, and the AUROC for LSTM_
trust further increases to 0.731. In terms of the precision, 
recall and F1 measure, the performances on both classes 
also demonstrate consistent improvement. LSTM_trust 
performs better than GRU_trust with an improvement of 
5.1% in terms of accuracy. Compared to the GRU model, it 
also shows improvement in all other metric values for both 
classes. This is because the LSTM model uses an additional 
memory unit which captures the temporal dependencies bet-
ter than the GRU model. The higher performance of these 
two RNN-based models indicate that not only using as 
input the user embeddings derived from the believability-
re-weighted retweet network is advantageous, but also when 
the embeddings are used in a RNN framework that takes into 
consideration temporal dependencies, we can improve the 
final classification effectiveness on users.
7.2  Reply‑only dataset
The reply dataset shows some interesting results compared to 
the retweet dataset. In Table 4, the Trustworthiness model 
shows an increase of 5.5% in accuracy and 4.6% in AUROC 
score than the Trustingness model, which suggests that 
trustworthiness score is a better metric than trustingness to 
classify users based on reply behavior. This can be explained 
as the fact that the reply network, similar to retweet network 
being very sparse, is also relatively smaller. In such a sparse, 
relatively small network, many star-shaped sub-graphs exist, 
with many nodes having no outgoing edges. As a result, 
those nodes have the same trustingness scores rendering 
trustworthiness scores are better scaled than trustingness 
scores.
The Interpolation model, not surprisingly, shows a simi-
lar effect on accuracy as the retweet-only case, i.e., its per-
formance lies between the two individual models. In terms 
of other metrics, it performs similarly as the Trustworthi-
ness model, which indicates that the simple interpolation 
without deeper integration cannot boost the performance 
further.
Noticeably, the L2_LR model performs even worse than 
all other baselines with some larger margin than the retweet-
only case, similar to a random guessing. This indicates that, 
being contrary to the general perception, learning is not 
helpful in this particular case. We attribute the poor perfor-
mance of L2_LR to two reasons: (1) the reply-only network 
is sparser and relatively smaller, which results in relatively 
weaker user embeddings; (2) more importantly, unlike RNN 
model, L2_LR learns the model based on individual user 
embeddings and cannot easily consider other users in the 
context of information propagation, rendering a weak pre-
dicative model.
An interesting observation in the baseline model statis-
tics is the poor recall and F1 score of the non-rumor class. 
It shows a bias towards predicting most classes as rumor 
Table 4  Results comparison of 
different identification models 
on the reply-only dataset)
‘+’ denotes rumor spreading user, and ‘−’ denotes non-rumor spreading user (TN: trustingness; TW: trust-
worthness; TNnTW:  interpolation; L2_LR:  L-2 regularized logistic regression; GRU_NW:  GRU_
noweight; GRU_NT: GRU_notrust; GRU_TR: GRU_trust; LSTM_TR: LSTM_trust
Method Model Class Accuracy AUROC Precision Recall F
1
Naive TN + 0.506 0.501 0.506 0.999 0.672
− 0.499 0.000 0.001
TW + 0.534 0.524 0.519 0.977 0.678
− 0.790 0.087 0.156
TNnTW + 0.532 0.524 0.518 0.979 0.678
− 0.797 0.08 0.145
L2_LR + 0.502 0.499 0.502 0.998 0.668
− 0.526 0.002 0.004
RNN GRU_NW + 0.544 0.591 0.696 0.124 0.210
− 0.529 0.948 0.679
GRU_NT + 0.546 0.594 0.646 0.164 0.262
− 0.532 0.913 0.672
GRU_TR + 0.612 0.689 0.561 0.146 0.232
− 0.618 0.923 0.741
LSTM_TR + 0.649 0.709 0.581 0.438 0.499
− 70.678 0.789 0.729
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spreaders, resulting in very low True Negatives and False 
Negatives, which is the opposite case of the retweet-only 
dataset (see Sect. 7.1). This could be attributed to the fact 
that compared to retweeting, where a user chooses to broad-
cast a tweet to all its followers, replying may not be a very 
strong metric of trustingness because it could imply various 
types of stances such as supporting, against or neutral.
Similar to the results on the retweet-only dataset, using 
RNN-based models show significant improvement in accu-
racies and AUROC score. The accuracy of GRU_noweight 
model is 0.544, an increase of 8.3% over previous baseline. 
The AUROC score also shows an increase of 18.4%. GRU_
notrust shows similar trend of improving results as the 
GRU_noweight model. Introducing Trust property in GRU_
trust model improved accuracy by over 12% and AUROC 
by 15.9%. Interestingly, all the GRU models have low Recall 
and F1 score for the rumor class. The LSTM_trust model 
shows the best results with the highest accuracy of 0.649, the 
highest AUROC score of 0.709, and more balanced metric 
values for both the classes.
7.3  Combined (retweet + reply) dataset
The retweet and reply datasets for user classification are 
merged to form this dataset, in which the retweeting and 
replying user sequences of the same source tweets are con-
catenated according to the sequence of time stamps of the 
user posting the responses. Experiments performed on this 
dataset also show interesting results.
Table 5 shows that for the first time the Trustingness 
model performs better than the Trustworthiness model, 
with an increase of 2.7% in accuracy and 11% in AUROC 
score. By examining the precision and recall specifically, 
we find that the improvement of the Trustingness model 
primarily comes from the significant rise of recall of 
rumor classes with only some minor drops on the preci-
sion of rumor class and the recall of non-rumor class. As 
shown in Table 2, the combined network is less sparse 
with more inter-connected nodes. It suggests that as most 
of the retweeter/replier nodes also have outgoing edges, 
the trustingness scores are better scaled in this case.
The Interpolation model also shows an improvement 
in all metrics. This can be attributed to the fact that both 
of the trust scores are better scaled due to the improved 
connectivity of the user network.
The L2_LR model shows an improvement of 13.7% in 
accuracy and 12.7% in AUROC score over the Interpola-
tion model. Further observation on the precision and recall 
unveils that significant improvement lies in the rumor class 
where the F1 is boosted by 58%. This indicates that the 
embeddings are much better due to the improved user net-
work density giving rise to the better scaled trust scores.
Similar to Table 3, RNN-based models show significant 
improvement in performance. The accuracy for GRU_
noweight model is 67.9%, giving an improvement of 7.9% 
over previous best baseline model. The model also shows 
a high AUROC score of 0.704. We can also observe that 
GRU_notrust outperforms GRU_noweight with 3.83% 
Table 5  Result comparison of 
different identification models 
on the combined (retweet and 
reply) dataset
‘+’ denotes rumor spreading user, and ‘−’ denotes non-rumor spreading user (TN: trustingness; TW: trust-
worthness; TNnTW:  interpolation; L2_LR:  L-2 regularized logistic regression; GRU_NW:  GRU_
noweight; GRU_NT: GRU_notrust; GRU_TR: GRU_trust; LSTM_TR: LSTM_trust)
Method Model Class Accuracy AUROC Precison Recall F
1
Naive TN + 0.551 0.612 0.533 0.289 0.376
− 0.558 0.779 0.650
TW + 0.536 0.551 0.584 0.012 0.023
− 0.535 0.992 0.695
TNnTW + 0.553 0.574 0.537 0.295 0.381
− 0.558 0.778 0.650
L2_LR + 0.629 0.647 0.602 0.602 0.602
− 0.652 0.652 0.652
RNN GRU_NW + 0.679 0.704 0.667 0.480 0.559
− 0.684 0.824 0.748
GRU_NT + 0.705 0.715 0.702 0.526 0.601
− 0.707 0.836 0.767
GRU_TR + 0.724 0.740 0.745 0.529 0.619
− 0.716 0.867 0.784
LSTM_TR + 0.738 0.795 0.758 0.559 0.643
− 0.729 0.869 0.793
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improvement in accuracy and 1.6% improvement in AUROC 
score, suggesting that the initial user network with only fol-
low relationship is helpful since user’s following behavior, 
although not strong, is a kind of, maybe the simplest form 
of, implication of user trust. In addition, the other two more 
advanced neural network models, i.e., GRU_trust and 
LSTM_trust, unsurprisingly make further improvement 
on the overall performance. The LSTM_trust model gives 
the best results in our experimental setup with an accuracy 
of 0.738 and AUROC score of 0.795. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the combined dataset is larger and the user 
network is denser.
7.4  Effect of change in hyper‑parameters
Furthermore, we studied the influence of the hyper-param-
eters of TSM algorithm, i.e., the involvement score, and 
the LINE algorithm, i.e., vector length of embeddings. We 
found, however, that there was no significant variations in 
any of the evaluation metric values. This indicates that our 
model is not sensitive to the setting of these hyper-parame-
ters. Therefore, we do not intend to present these marginally 
different results in the paper.
In addition, we also studied the effect of sparse user net-
works by considering alternative proxies such as ‘1 men-
tion’, ‘1 reply’, and ‘1 retweet’ without sparsity relief by 
excluding follow relationship, which leads to an edge con-
necting two users if there is one ‘@’ mention, one reply or 
one retweet between them. However, the results are overall 
discouraging: the naive approaches were giving close to 50% 
performance in accuracy, and the RNN-based models gave 
only a slight improvement of around 55%. Therefore, we did 
not demonstrate them here in detail.
8  Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we conducted a pilot study for the identifica-
tion of rumor spreading users on Twitter based on compu-
tational trust measures. We proposed a machine-learning 
framework using the novel concept of believability which 
is defined based upon the trust measures of individual users 
in a large-scale retweet network. The key hypotheses are 
that: (1) the believability between two users is proportional 
to the trustingness of the responder and the trustworthiness 
of the source, where trustingness and trustworthiness are 
two complementary trust measures inferred from users’ 
behaviors; (2) in return, using the believability for edge re-
weighting on the networks can help enhance the learning 
of feature representation of users in the network, whereby 
the users’ structural properties can be better preserved in 
terms of neighborhood similarity, signaling the distinctive 
roles different types of users play in spreading messages. 
We proposed LSTM- and GRU-based RNN models for user 
classification using user embeddings as input features that 
are generated from the believability re-weighted retweet net-
work. Experimental results on a large real-world user clas-
sification dataset collected from Twitter demonstrate that 
the proposed RNN-based method outperformed four more 
straightforward methods with large margin.
The research work could be used to build Social Media 
Reputation framework (similar to how feedback scores for 
eBay users is calculated). We can associate a trust score to 
the users in social media that would let service providers 
to authenticate the veracity of information. Low trust users 
when detected can be monitored to prevent any future occur-
rence of rumor propagation. Thus this research can be used to 
make social media a more veracious source of information.
Overall, the performance on detecting rumor spreaders is 
not very high, indicating the task is difficult. In the future, 
we plan to extend our model by incorporating additional 
proxies of trust more than just retweets and replies. The 
stance of a user who replies the message is an important 
indicator as to whether the user is a rumor spreader or not. 
We will try to directly model user stances with deeper under-
standing of the concerned user’s profile and interactions in 
the past for inferring the hidden intent and motivation of 
users retweeting a message.
We would also like to make a distinction between regu-
lar, non-regular users and bots to study their rumor spread-
ing characteristics. We shall enhance our data collection to 
alleviate the sparsity of user trust networks which seems 
an important issue. In addition, we propose to study rumor 
information detection based on user trust networks and com-
pare it with state-of-the-art detection systems. Meanwhile, 
we would be interested to investigate how to perform multi-
ple detection tasks in rumorous environment such as detect-
ing rumors and their spreaders at the same time.
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